In the first empirical assessment of the incidence of mobile banking on financial intermediary development in Africa, we use two definitions of the financial system: the traditional IFS (2008) in less developed countries is now captured by mobile-banking.
Introduction
The mobile revolution has transformed the lives of many Africans, providing not just communications but also basic financial access in the form of phone-based money transfer and storage (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012) . The high growth and penetration rates of mobile telephony that is transforming cell phones into pocket-banks in Africa is providing opportunities for countries on the continent to increase affordable and cost effective means of bringing on board a large chunk of the population that hitherto has been excluded from formal financial services for decades. Such a transformation is of interest not only to banks and Micro Financial Institutions (MFIs) but also to governments, financial regulators as well as development partners who are providing support to improve the livelihoods of Africans through poverty reduction and sustained economic growth.
At the Connect Africa summit in 2007, Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda asserted: "in ten short years, what was once an object of luxury and privilege, the mobile phone has become a basic necessity in Africa" (Aker & Mbiti,2010,208 ). An article in The Economist (2008) also reported: "a device that was a yuppie toy not so long ago has now become a potent for economic development in the world's poorest countries". This paper seeks to assess if these sentiments and slogans reflect the reality of the consequences of mobile phone on financial development in Africa?
Beyond, the need to investigate these perceptions, there is a growing body of work pointing to the imperative of more scholarly research on a phenomenon whose time is now: mobile banking. To the best of our knowledge, one of the most exhaustive accounts on the 'mobile phone' development literature concludes: "Existing empirical evidence on the effect of mobile phone coverage and services suggest that the mobile phone can potentially serve as a tool for economic development in Africa. But (Aker & Mbiti,2010,224) . Also, as sustained by Maurer (2008) and confirmed in subsequent literature (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright, 2012) , scholarly research on the adoption and socioeconomic impacts of m-banking (payments) systems in the developing world is scares. From a broad perspective, most studies on mobilebanking have been theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012) . The few existing empirical works hinge on country-specific and micro-level data(collected from surveys) for the most part (Demombynes & Thegeya ,2012) . This paper aims to assess what incidence mobile banking has had on financial development. By distinguishing its effect on formal and informal financial intermediary sectors, findings could have substantial policy relevance; especially on which financial sectors are benefiting most owing to the soaring phenomenon of mobile banking. The seminal character of this work also adds to the literature by proposing some hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial development which could provide the much needed guidance to policy makers on the financial development empirics of mobile banking. Our contribution to the literature is therefore threefold. Firstly, we complement existing theoretical literature on the mobile-finance nexus by providing the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the incidence of the phenomenon on financial development 2 . Secondly, owing to the debate over which financial sectors are benefiting most from mobile banking, we assess its impact by disentangling financial depth to include a previously missing component. Hence we are able to capture both formal and informal financial intermediary development effects. Thirdly, 5 based on the findings, we provide relevant measures that could guide future search and macroeconomic policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature.
Data and methodology are presented and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Existing literature

Theoretical framework
Mobile penetration and finance
According to Jonathan & Camilo(2009) , most mobile transactions 3 in the developing world enable users to do three things. (a) Store value (currency) in an account accessible via a handset. When the user already has a bank account, this is generally a question of linking to a bank account. If the user does not have an account, then the process creates a bank account for him/her or creates a pseudo bank account, held by a third party or the user's mobile operator.
(b) Convert cash into and out of the store value account. When the account is linked to a bank account, then users can visit banks to cash-in and cash-out. In many instances, users can also visit the GSM providers' retail stores. In most flexible services, a user can visit a corner kiosk or grocery store (maybe the same one where he/she purchases airtime) and transact with an independent retailer working as an agent for the transaction system. (c) Transfer stored value between accounts. Users can generally transfer funds between accounts linked to two mobile phones, by using a set of SMS messages (or menu commands) and PIN codes. The new 3 In order to have a mobile money account and make a deposit, a customer must own a cell phone SIM card with the mobile operator and register for a mobile money account. The customer then makes cash deposits at the physical offices of one of the operator's mobile money agents. These cash deposits create electronic money credit in the account. Customers can make person-to-person transfers of mobile money credit to the accounts of other mobile money users in the same network. They can also use their mobile money credit to pay bills and to buy phone airtime. Withdrawals (conversion to cash) could be made at the offices of the network's mobile money agents. There is also a possibility for a mobile money customer to make a transfer to someone who is not registered with the same network. In this case, when notice of the transfer is received through an SMS text message, the recipient can receive the cash at a mobile money agent (Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012) .
6 services offer a way to move money from place to place and present an alternative to the payments system offered by banks, pawn shops, remittance firms…etc. The uptake of mbanking(payments) systems has been particularly strong in the Philippines(where three million customers use systems offered by mobile operators Smart & Globe; Neville,2006) ; Kenya(where nearly two million users registered with Safaricom M-PESA system within a year of its nationwide rollout, Vaughan,2007; Ivatury & Mas,2008) and South Africa where 450, 000 people use Wizzit('the bank in your pocket'; Ivatury & Pickens, 2006) or one of two other national systems (Porteous,2007) . Demombynes, & Thegeya(2012) have approached the mobile-finance nexus through the concept of savings. They distinguish two types of mobile savings. (a) Basic mobile savings; which is simply the use of a standard mobile money system such as M-PESA to store funds. These basic mobile savings do not earn interest. Bank-integrated mobile savings perspectives have received a great deal of attention as a way to provide banking services to the poor. They have the edge of offering access to basic banking services without requiring proximity to a physical bank branch. Hence, with a bank-integrated mobile savings account, basic banking services can be accessed through a network of mobile phone agents, which in Kenya outnumber the weight of bank branches by a factor of 100 to 1 (Mas & Radcliffe, 2011) . The term 'partially integrated' mobile savings system is also used to describe situations where bank account access via mobile phones is contingent on the establishment of a traditional account at a physical bank.
More so banks are beginning to build their own agent networks in order to assume a more competitive bargaining position in accessing mobile service platforms. Fully and partially integrated savings present different types of contracts among the partnering bank and mobile service provider. According to Demombynes & Thegeya(2012) , on the one hand a partially integrated product clearly delineates the role of the bank(which provides and owns 7 banking services) from that of the mobile service provider(which provides mobile telephony infrastructure and controls the agent network). Thus the bank compensates the mobile service provider for access to the network and enjoys the remaining profits. This type of contract more closely looks like a debt contract between parties. On the other hand, a fully integrated solution may not draw the same distinction between bank and mobile service providers. In this case, the distribution of surplus is contingent on the relative bargaining power of the bank and mobile service provider. This sort of contract more closely resembles an equity contract between two parties. Equity-like contracts are more likely to be complex and therefore more difficult to negotiate than debt-like contracts, there-by presenting a potential hurdle towards the goal of increasing access.
Ondiege (2010), Chief Economist of the African Development Bank looks at the mobile-finance nexus from four perspectives. Firstly, the mobile phone can serve as a virtual bank card where customer and institution information can be securely stored, thereby avoiding the cost of distributing cards to customers. In fact he postulates, the subscriber identity module (SIM) card inside most (if not all) GSM phones is in itself a smartcard (similar to the virtual bank card). Therefore, the banks customer's PIN and account number can be stored on this SIM card to perform the same functions as the bank virtual card.
Secondly, the mobile phone may serve as a point of sale (POS) terminal. As such a mobile phone could be used to transact and communicate with the appropriate financial institution to solicit transaction authorization. These are the same functions of a POS terminal at mails, retail or other stores. A mobile phone can duplicate these functionalities with ease. Thirdly, the mobile phone can also be used as an ATM. A POS is thus used to pay for goods and services at the store. If cash and access to savings were to be considered as 'goods and services', that customers buy and store, then the POS will also serve as a cash collection and distribution point which basically is the function of an automatic teller machine(ATM).
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Fourthly, the mobile phone may be used as an Internet banking terminal. Implying it offers two fundamental customer services: a) ability to make payments and transfers remotely and; b) instant access to any account. Hence the mobile phone device and wireless connectivity bring the internet terminal into the hands of otherwise unbanked customers.
Instrumental variables
In this section, we provide theoretical bases to justify the choice of instrumental variables for the empirical phase of the paper. Thus, we provide theoretical justification to the empirical validity of legal-origins, income-levels, religious-dominations and press-freedom qualities in the finance-growth nexus.
In the first strand, we highlight the basis for legal-origin moment conditions. This could be explained from two stances: the 'law & finance theory' and the 'political and adaptability' channels. The first stance of the law and finance theory emphasizes that legal institutions influence corporate finance and financial development (La Porta et al., 1998) . The law and finance theory stresses that cross-country disparities in (i) contract, company, bankruptcy and security laws, (ii) the legal system's emphasis on private property rights, and (iii) the efficiency of enforcement, influence the degree of expropriation and hence the confidence with which people purchase securities and take part in financial markets. In the second stance we find theories by Beck et al. (2003) which assess 'why' legal origin matter in financial development. They examine two channels by which legal origins may influence financial development: the political 4 and adaptability 5 channels.
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In the second strand, we provide theoretical justification to the choice of income-level instrumental variables. It has been well documented that wealth-effects, play a substantial role in the finance-growth nexus (Beck et al., 1999; Asongu, 2011a) . From theoretical and empirical literature standpoints, considerable differences in wealth exiting across countries have substantial effects on cross-country disparities in financial structure and development (Asongu, 2012) . Theoretical justification for wealth-effects is grounded on three perspectives.
Firstly, financial intermediary development engenders: central banks assets to total assets, deposit money bank assets to total assets, other financial institutions' assets to total assets and deposit money versus central bank assets (Beck et al.1999, p.13) . According to this position, central banks loose relative importance as one move from low to high-income countries, whereas other financial institutions gain relative importance in the process. Conversely, deposit money banks gain importance versus central banks with a higher income level.
Financial depth also increases with income levels. Secondly, private credit and life insurance companies, the life insurance penetration and the life insurance density increase with GDP per capita. Interestingly, for the first two indicators, the lower-middle income group exhibits the lowest medians (Beck et al., 1999, p.21) 6 . Thirdly, there is a significant variation in size, activity and efficiency of stock markets across income groups. Countries with higher levels of GDP per capita have bigger, more active and more efficient financial markets (Beck et al., 1999, 25) 7 .
In the third strand we lay the theoretical foundation for the empirical validity of the religious instruments. According to Hearn et al.(2011) , Islam represents a system of beliefs founded on the interpretation of passages from the Qu'ran and various Had'ith & Sunnah that are short texts regarding customs of the Muslim community and relating experiences of the prophet Mohammed (Pryor, 2007) . These form the basis of Shari'ya law, that permeates all areas of the wider Islamic system, including economics, finance, law, politics and government and that have common values of Islamic social justice (Asutey,2007) . The Islamic financial system is founded and regulated on the same Shari'ya principles as the overall economy and society (Iqbal, 1997) . These govern the nature of contracts and the design of institutions to guide the market and regulation of participants' behavior. Hence, individuals within an
Islamic financial system will be subject to behavioral norms, which give rise to very heterogeneous assumptions to those that form the foundation of regulation in western markets.
In the last strand, we highlight a case for the choice of press-freedom instrumental variables. From a theoretical standpoint, press-freedom and the Efficiency Market Hypothesis (EMH) of finance move hand-in-hand. Empirically, freedom of the press is one of the major efficient market channels and only with unrestricted press-freedom can information be rapidly spread and fully incorporated into asset prices (Guo-Ping, 2008).
Mobile penetration in Africa
Borrowing from Mbiti & Weil (2011) , the story of the growth of mobile phones in Africa is one of a tectonic and unexpected change in communications technology. From virtually unconnected in the 1990s, over 60% of Africa now has mobile phone coverage and there are now over ten times as many mobiles as landline phones in use (Aker & Mbiti, 2010) . 
Scope and positioning of the paper
The proliferation of mobile money in Africa has generated research attempting to explain the roots of the phenomenon as well as understanding its effects. Existing literature has focused on the rapid growth of mobile money (Kimenyi & Ndung'u,2009) 8 , arguing that the initial success of the mobile money transfer industry can be attributed to the high demand for remittances generated by rural/urban migration (Comninos et al.,2008) and its rapid scaling is due to mobile providers growth strategy (Jack & Suri, 2011) . Other papers have examined the economic impact of mobile banking (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Mbiti & Weil, 2011) . For the most part these studies in Africa have been country-specific (Mbiti & Weil, 2011; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012) , based on micro-data (Mbiti & Weil, 2011; Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012) and greased with theoretical postulations (Porteous, 2006; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Ondiege, 2010; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012) become a basic necessity in Africa" (Aker & Mbiti,2010,208 (Aker & Mbiti,2010,224) . Also, as postulated by Maurer (2008) and confirmed in subsequent literature (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright,2012) , scholarly research on the adoption and socioeconomic impacts of m-banking(payments) systems in the developing world is scares. From a broad perspective, most studies on mobilebanking have been theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012 ). The few existing empirical studies hinge on country-specific and micro-level data(collected from surveys) for the most part (Demombynes & Thegeya ,2012) .
In this paper we assess what incidence mobile banking has had on financial development. By distinguishing its effect on formal and informal financial intermediary sectors, findings could be of substantial policy relevance; especially on mastering which financial sectors are benefiting most owing to the soaring phenomenon of mobile banking.
Previous research on the mobile-finance nexus has been country-specific and limited to micro-economic data (Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012) . Hence the seminal character of this work also adds to the literature by proposing some hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial development. Hence it provides new indicators as well as the much needed guidance to policy makers on the financial empirics of 'mobile banking'. In summary, our contribution to the literature is threefold. Firstly, we complement existing theoretical literature on mobile banking by providing the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the incidence of the phenomenon on financial development. Secondly, owing to the debate over which financial sectors are benefiting most from mobile banking, we assess its impact by disentangling financial depth to integrate a previously missing component. Hence we are able to capture both formal and informal financial intermediary development effects. Thirdly, based on the findings, we provide relevant measures that could guide future search and macroeconomic policy.
Data and methodology
Data
We examine a sample of 52 African countries with data from African Development In a bid for clarity in presentation, we classify selected variables into two main strands below.
Financial intermediary development a) Financial depth
Borrowing from the FDSD and recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2011bcd) , 
b) Financial efficiency
By financial intermediation efficiency here, this study neither refers to a profitabilityoriented concept nor to the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: DEA). What we seek to highlight is the ability of banks to effectively fulfill their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators (agents). We adopt proxies for banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively 'bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd' and 'financial system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd'). Like with financial depth, these two financial allocation efficiency proxies can cross-check each other as they represent more than 83% of variability in one another (see Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
With respect to the FDSD we measure financial intermediary size as the ratio of "deposit bank assets" to "total assets" (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets: Dbacba).
d) Financial activity
By financial intermediary activity here, the work highlights the ability of banks to grant credit to economic operators. We proxy for both banking system intermediary activity and financial system intermediary activity with "private domestic credit by deposit banks:
Pcrb" and "private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: Pcrbof"
respectively. The later measure cross-checks the former as it represents more than 92% of information in the former (see Appendix 2).
e) Formal, informal and semi-formal financial developments
In line with Asongu(2011a) 
Estimation technique
Given the concern for endogeneity, we borrow from Beck et al.(2003) and recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2011de) by adopting a Two-Stage-Least-Squares(TSLS) estimation approach. Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation addresses the puzzle of deterioration of the formal banking sector to the benefit of other sectors (informal and semi-formal). See Asongu (2011a) . 13 An OIR restrictions test to examine instrument validity is only possible in the presence of over-identification. That is, the instruments must be greater than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In cases of exact-identification (instruments=endogenous explaining variables) and under-identification (instruments <endogenous explaining variables), this OIR-Sargan test is not applicable.
endogeneity and hence avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term in the main equation. The TSLS-IV estimation method adopted by this study will entail the following steps.
First-stage regression:
(1) Second-stage regression:
The independent control variables are represented by X in the two equations. In Eq. (1) and Eq.(2), v and u respectively denote the disturbance terms. Legal-origins, dominantreligions, income-levels and press-freedom qualities represent the instruments. 'Mobile penetration' and 'financial development dynamics' are the endogenous variables in the first and second equations respectively.
In the specification of the models, we lay emphasis on the following: (1) verify the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables, conditional on other covariates (control variables); (2) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.
Robustness checks
For robustness purposes, the empirical analysis: (1) uses alternative measures of financial development; (2) employs two distinct interchangeable sets of instruments; (3) accounts for endogeneity; (4) models with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors.
Empirical analysis
Presentation of results
This empirical section addresses two main issues: (1) the ability of the exogenous components of mobile banking to explain financial intermediary development dynamics and;
(2) the ability of the instruments to account for financial intermediary development dynamics beyond the mobile banking channel. To make theses assessments, we employ the TSLS-IV estimation approach with legal-origins, income-levels, religious-dominations and pressfreedom qualities as instrumental variables. While the first issue is addressed by the significance of estimated coefficients, the second is contingent on results of the Sargan-OIR test. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the position that, the instruments do not explain financial development dynamics beyond the mobile banking channel. Hence a rejection of the null hypothesis is a rejection of the stance that the instruments explain financial development dynamics only through the mobile banking channel. In other words, this rejection questions the validity of the instruments and substance of the mobile banking channel in accounting for cross-country variations in financial intermediary dynamics. While Table 1 elasticities of finance point to the deterioration of the traditional financial intermediary dynamics owing to the phenomenon of mobile penetration. This negative incidence is more pronounced in financial system activity than in banking system activity and also more witnessed in financial system deposits than in economic financial depth. Two facts explain these disparities in weight of elasticities. (1) Mobile-banking has a greater negative incidence on 'financial system activity' than 'banking system activity' because the former entails the semi-formal banking activity which should also be negatively affected by the phenomenon.
The interpretation is valid on the condition that, the phenomenon also negatively affects semiformal financial intermediation activity (the difference between financial system activity and banking system activity). This is only logical because semi-formal finance according to the IFS (2008) definition of the financial system entails specialized non-bank and other financial institutions like rural banks, post banks, credit unions…etc. From intuition and commonsense, mobile banking should therefore negatively impinge on semi-formal banking activities because of their quasi-formal settings. In plainer terms, credit (financial activity) allocated by the semi-formal financial sector also reduces owing to mobile banking. (2) Financial system depth is more negatively affected by mobile banking than economic financial depth. This is only logical from common-sense and theoretical postulations elucidated at the first phase of this paper. Economic financial depth is overall money supply (M2) and is made-up of the financial system's depth (formal and semi-formal depths) as well as the informal financial sector depth (which is a great chunk of the monetary base: M0, in developing countries) that does not transit through the banks and other financial institutions recognized by the financial system (IFS,2008) . Hence it is only logical that, mobile-penetration has a less negative incidence on overall economic financial depth. Another supposition resulting from this interpretation is the fact that, the less negative incidence on overall economic financial depth 21 attests to a hypothetical positive incidence of mobile banking on the informal financial sector (which is still not a component of the financial system according to the IFS, 2008 definition).
The second issue is addressed by the Sargan OIR test, overwhelming failure to reject the null hypothesis of this test points to the validity of the instruments and suggests that they (instruments) do not explain the financial intermediary dynamics beyond the mobile banking channel. With respect to both issues, results of Panel A are robust to those of Panel B.
Note should be taken of the fact that, Table 1 is based on the IFS(2008) definition of the financial system which is comprised of only the formal banking system and other financial institutions(semi-formal banking sector). Regressions in Table 2 however, relax the IFS (2008) assumption and integrate a previously missing component of the financial system (informal sector) into the conception and definition of the financial system; in line with Asongu, (2011a) . This redefinition of the financial system is premised on two counts: (1) theoretically, the growing phenomenon of mobile-banking is escaping the grasp of the formal and semi-formal financial sectors; (2) empirically our findings in Table 1 Table 2 below is based on the Asongu (2011a) definition of the financial system which integrates the previously missing informal financial sector component into the IFS (2008) definition. Instead of using traditional indicators of financial development based on dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size as captured by Table 1, Table 2 are TSLS-IV regressions without HAC standard errors, the 6 th to the 9 th columns reflect their counterparts with HAC standard errors.
Like in the previous table, two main issues outlined in the introduction of this section are assessed. Looking at the first concern, the following could be noticed. (1) Mobile-banking has a positive incidence on informal financial development; both in absolute and relative terms. Its positive elasticity with respect to the absolute measure (Informal 1) is less pronounced than that in respect of the relative indicator (Informal 2). A logical deduction is that, the informal sector grows more owing to improvements of M2 than in GDP growth.
Hence growth of the informal sector is more pronounced at the expense of the formal and semi-formal sectors (constituents of M2) than to the detriment of many other macroeconomic variables (constituents of GDP). Plainly put, the share of informal finance is more relevant in M2 growth than in GDP growth. (2) The mobile-banking elasticity of 'informal and semiformal financial development' (0.854) is higher than that of 'informal financial development' (0.853). A logical interpretation that follows is that, financial deposits (depth) of the semiformal financial institutions increase only by a thin margin owing to mobile banking. (3) The incidence of mobile banking on formal financial development has the right negative sign, albeit not significant. This broadly confirms the results in Table 1 . However note should be taken of the fact that, the formal banking sector of Table 2 entails only bank deposits(depth), 24 while the financial depth of Table 1 is made-up of financial system deposits. This difference therefore partly elucidates the insignificance of the negative sign.
With regard to the second concern, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan-OIR test in all regressions point to the validity of the instruments. It follows that the instruments explain indicators of financial sector importance through no other mechanisms than the mobile banking channel. Ultimately the instruments are not correlated with the error term in the equation of interest and hence do not suffer from endogeneity. The regressions are duplicated with the second set of robust instruments and the same findings are noticed. 
Further discussion of results, policy implications and future directions
Before we delve into further discussion of the results, it is imperative to outline the intuition motivating this paper. (1) Some voices have expressed sentiments on the instrumentality of mobile-phones in African development (The Economist, 2008; Aker & Mbiti, 2010, 208) . This paper has assessed if these sentiments and slogans are material with respect to financial development. (2) (Aker & Mbiti,2010,224) . (3)As postulated by Maurer (2008) and confirmed in subsequent literature (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright, 2012) , scholarly research on the adoption and socioeconomic impacts of m-banking systems in the developing world is scares. From a broad perspective, most studies on mobile banking have been theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012 ). The few existing empirical studies hinge on country-specific and micro-level data(collected from surveys) for the most part (Demombynes & Thegeya ,2012) .
In this paper we have assessed what incidence mobile banking has had on financial development. By distinguishing its effect on formal and informal financial intermediary sectors, findings have been of substantial policy relevance as to which financial sectors are benefiting most owing to the soaring phenomenon of mobile banking. Previous research on the mobile-finance nexus has been country-specific and limited to micro-economic data (Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012) . Beyond the use of macroeconomic variables, the seminal character of this work has added to the literature by proposing some hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial development which could provided the much needed guidance to policy makers on the financial empirics of mobile banking. Our contribution to existing literature has been threefold. Firstly, we have complemented existing theoretical literature on the mobile-finance nexus by providing the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the incidence of 'mobile banking' on financial development. Secondly, owing to the debate over which financial sectors are benefiting most from mobile banking, we have assessed its impact by disentangling financial depth to include a previously missing component. Hence we have 26 been able to capture both formal and informal financial intermediary development effects.
Thirdly, based on the findings, we will provide relevant policy measures that could guide future search and macroeconomic policy.
In this first empirical assessment of the incidence of mobile banking on financial intermediary development in Africa, we have used two definitions of the financial system: the traditional IFS (2008) 
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Beside rethinking monetary policy transmission mechanisms, other future research directions could include: (1) ascertaining whether and how mobile phones can lead to poverty reduction through growth and financial development; (2) an assessment of short, medium and long-term incidences of mobile phones on financial development is also worthy of note; (3) consequences of regulation on mobile banking; (4) last but not the least, monetary policy tools that could fight inflation resulting from mobile banking activities.
Conclusion
In the first empirical assessment of the incidence of mobile banking on financial intermediary development in Africa, we have used two definitions of the financial system: the traditional IFS (2008) 
